Organizers must be committed if a program is to be successful, particularly when multiple agencies and organizations come together. Inter-agency cooperative efforts are never easy and difficulties are compounded when non-government organizations are added to the mix. Organizers of the OMAB nomination faced problems that arose from, and were magnified by, lukewarm support and tenuous commitment from sponsoring agencies and organizations.
External Motivations and Internal Needs
It appeared that the impetus to establish a MAB was externally, rather than internally motivated. The first Steering Committee Chairperson, David Foster, indicated that he and other agency representatives from various states were invited to attend a conference sponsored by the United States Man and the Biosphere Reserve Program. The 1988 meeting was held at the Land Between the Lakes recreational area in Kentucky. At this meeting US MAB officials pitched the MAB concept and Foster, then a representative from Ozark Scenic Riverways National Park in Missouri, was receptive to the idea. With the blessing of US MAB he began to scout for interested agencies and environmental organizations in Missouri and Arkansas. Largely through his efforts alone, the nomination effort began to take shape.
In the Ozarks, no agencies, organizations, or communities actively sought out the US MAB program of their own initiative. Many agency representatives we talked with reported limited familiarity with all aspects of the program. They had perhaps heard of MAB in passing from time to time but had not actively investigated the program. It is not surprising then that the MAB program, specifically, was somewhat of an afterthought. As one committee representative stated:
You have to understand, in 1990 and even in 1988 when this was established, the agencies weren’t looking into [a] Man and the Biosphere. They were looking for a way to share data and they were looking for the vehicle that they could cooperatively work together. … None of the, to my knowledge, agency heads started out saying let’s meet and have a Man in the Biosphere(George Oviatt, personal interview)
Agencies joined the nomination effort for various reasons, but for many the MAB designation was not a primary goal. Rather, MAB appeared to be an available and convenient way to further agency cooperation in management of local natural resources. OMAB participants wanted to focus on adopting the principles of sustainability. Most agencies wanted an opportunity to apply a holistic concept of management and to integrate socioeconomic and physical factors. Moreover, participants each had their own visions of how the MAB should work and what it could do for them in terms of improving their ability to successfully manage natural resources. For example, a Missouri Department of Conservation (MDC) representative indicated that the Biosphere Reserve effort was essentially a way for the Park Service to develop a watershed based management strategy in order to improve water quality in the national parks (Ken Smith, personal interview).
In some cases, agency representatives stated that agency participation was largely non-voluntary. This was the case with the Arkansas Game and Fish Commission (AG&F) who, by most accounts, were only half-hearted in their participation. A representative of AG&F reported that they became involved because they were obligated by state policy. He said,
Anything that will affect our responsibilities, which is managing fish and wildlife resources of the state, we always try to look in to. We’re required really, to look at any kind of activities, projects, proposals, or whatever that will effect our operation. (Brent Connor, personal interview)
As the first Committee Chair confirmed, "Arkansas Game and Fish were invited [and], from the beginning, they were players off and on through the whole process. They were interested, but they weren’t interested enough to have someone at every meeting (David Foster, personal interview)." Judging from conversations with AG&F representatives, the agency had no real ideological commitment or enthusiasm for the MAB program or the nomination effort.
In essence, agency participants regarded the prospective OMAB as something they could do to enhance their ability to manage resources. Or they viewed the nomination as yet another task they must do as a consequence of mandated responsibilities. In either case, the implementation of the OMAB was essentially a matter of agency business. The nomination had little to do with local communities and residents in terms of impact or benefits. They were simply passive beneficiaries of agency efforts to more effectively manage natural resources. The nomination was nothing extraordinary.
A Long Time in Coming
The lengthy process of the nomination was a source of frustration for several committee representatives, and for many lay people. The considerable amount of time it took to put the nomination together contributed to troubles down the line. Organizations and agencies participating in the nomination process seemed to disappear from the picture between the time of initial activity in the late 1980’s and the resurrection of the nomination effort in 1996. Many agencies and organizations that sponsored the initial Feasibility Study did not continue as active members of the effort or took on negligible roles.
The vast span of time the process engulfed also made turnover of representatives an issue. Over the nomination’s tenure, key committee members were lost and agency representatives were often replaced with new representatives unfamiliar with the MAB program and the history of the OMAB nomination. This turnover proved disruptive to the nomination effort in two ways: first, loss of organizational memory and experience; and second, loss of the key organizer.
In some cases, newly appointed agency representatives had only limited knowledge and understanding of the MAB concept and the OMAB nomination effort years after the nomination effort had been in full swing. Because most activity on the nomination process, including meetings and correspondence for example, occurred before 1994, representatives who came on board after this time had limited opportunities to participate fully. For example, the AG&F representative assigned to the OMAB in 1996 had never attended a Steering Committee meeting. During the course of our conversation, he remarked that "I’m not completely up on the program myself. I don’t know all the little details. I’d like someone to explain the whole thing to me too (Brent Conner, personal interview)."
This individual’s lack of familiarity with the program became a liability when the public controversy began. At that time he recommended that his agency hold off on signing the OMAB agreement until he could, "…look a little bit closer [at the program]. Because I wouldn’t have gotten that many calls if there wasn’t something, some problem that we needed to know about (Brent Conner, personal interview)." Later in the interview he explained why he felt compelled to further investigate the MAB after the onset of controversy. When asked, "You were looking at the program? Looking to see if there was some sort of regulatory power that your agency hadn’t seen before?" He responded:
Yes, because if there were something, even [if it was] a federal agency trying to take private property. [Our] properties are for specific purposes. We as an agency hold these lands in public trust [and] we wouldn’t want the government, even the federal government, taking our lands for some other purpose. (Brent Conner, personal interview)
Representatives involved during the first five years of the effort had more opportunity to become familiar with the MAB concept and the OMAB nomination. Others were left to piece together an understanding and history from informal conversations and historical documents; that is, if they had the time and motivation to do so.
A second difficulty arising from the long duration of the nomination was the loss of its first leader. From the project’s inception, leadership in the nomination effort rested entirely with David Foster of Ozark National Scenic Riverways (ONSR). Participating agencies relied on Foster to motivate others and to keep the process going, a role that Foster maintained until his retirement in 1995. Even before his retirement, however, Foster de-intensified his role in the midst of the long nomination process. He was no longer the driving force committee members had grown accustomed to. Oviatt , the second Committee chairman stated,
My observation is the effort kind of waned from Dave Foster’s standpoint, given his increased workload. You have to realize he was given this job just like most others are. You know that’s not his primary focus. It kind of waxed and waned for about another year and then in late 1995 he announced his retirement. So, from the time of his retirement to the time I picked it up there was really nothing done. All the agencies were just sitting back. Nobody was contacting anybody saying ‘Where is this going?’ (George Oviatt, personal interview)
The nomination effort suffered greatly with his retirement. Devin Shaw, a Southern Missouri journalist who covered the OMAB issue, suspected that Foster’s untimely retirement "put the whole thing in limbo (personal interview)." In Shaw’s opinion, if Foster had continued as Chairman "things would have either come to a head sooner or he would have done some PR stuff. [With] the proper kind of public notice to get people familiar with the program, …it might have turned out differently (personal interview)." Steve Wright, a reporter for the Northwest Arkansas Times, conveyed this same sentiment to his readership writing, "If someone hadn’t dropped the ball on this process, the Ozark Highland would be part of the MAB. And I promise you, no one in the Ozarks would know the difference (1996:B6)."
Agency Commitment
The duration of the process and the retirement of its first chair, however, may not have proven problematic if the participating agencies and organizations had been more enthusiastic and committed to the nomination. Committee members were not strongly committed to, or intensely invested in, the project themselves. They participated when necessary, but relied on Foster to keep the nomination moving. Shaw observed,
Dave Foster was pretty much spearheading it and the others would just come to the meeting and just give their input. When Foster retired, these other agencies weren’t picking up the ball. It was just something they were going to [do because] the Park Service asked them. (personal interview)
Committee representatives we talked to expressed no ownership of or responsibility for the OMAB effort. As though Foster were the only driving force, one MDC representative commented it was Foster who "dropped the ball" in 1993 or 1994 when the OMAB nomination was coming together. Similar sentiments were expressed by an official from AG&F who remarked, "…my perception was that there was a waning of activity among the pushers [of the Biosphere program] (John Hunt, personal interview)." As the years passed and the pusher stopped pushing, the process fell dormant. Participating agencies, being bureaucratically ambivalent about the nomination, chose not to make any efforts to move the process along. As the nomination effort waned, agencies and organizations either tabled the effort or turned their attention to other concepts or programs.
Why did the process drag on so slowly? Aside from the general ambivalence from most participating agencies, lack of human resources and agency disagreements were culprits in lengthening the process. The stock answer given by agency informants dealt with lack of resources. Agencies and their representatives were participating in this effort while trying to continue meeting existing responsibilities of their own agencies and positions. For all involved, the OMAB effort was another responsibility on an already full plate. Foster remarked that the length of the nomination was not an indication of lack of interest, rather "[it was] by necessity a slow process. Nobody had resources to assign a person to it for six months and say ‘you guys sit down for six months or a year and crank this out (personal interview)." The practical consequence of this situation was the difficulty in making time to work out the philosophical and technical issues. To complicate matters further, representatives present at meetings were often not those with decision-making or negotiating authority.
Differences in agency mandates and interagency competitiveness were additional obstacles. Shaw, an outsider to the nomination process, observed that "there was a lot of disagreement among the agencies [about] your agency-type concerns (personal interview)." Affirming this observation, a representative from the Ozark Regional Land Trust (ORLT), the only local, non-government organization involved with the nomination effort, cited agency disagreement and politicking as a hindrance toward a nomination. He stated,
There’s a certain competitiveness and territorialness among government agencies. They all want to be the first to do anything. They want funding, they want recognition, they want political positioning. It’s a miracle this thing ever even happened in the Ozarks because they seemed to be holding back [saying], ‘but we got our own thing’ [and] ‘what’s in it for us to get involved.’(Ben Johnson, personal interview)
Agencies had difficulty working out the finer points of the nomination. There were difficulties surrounding issues of funding, coordinating, and staffing. Conflict also surrounded discussion over geographical inclusions of agency holdings, language of documents, and agency commitment and responsibility regarding management of resources within their jurisdiction.
Finally, participating agencies were concerned about their own reputations and standing with constituents. As one committee representative remarked, "there’s… fear that they (the agencies) [will be] guilty by association. …[If one agency does something that draws criticism,] is that going to bring bad publicity for innocent agencies because they are associated with others (Ben Johnson, personal interview)." All of these concerns, coupled with limited resources, drew the process out. Agencies were uncomfortable with signing on to the cooperative. Inability to agree amongst themselves and to efficiently work together toward a nomination surely contributed to the lack of commitment to the program once controversy began.
Who’s In and Who’s Out?
Regardless of who ‘dropped the ball’ and why, nomination enthusiasm had certainly waned by the onset of opposition in 1996. In July of 1996, George Oviatt attempted to revive the stagnant process by sending letters out to determine if committee members were still interested in pursuing the nomination. Around this time, intense public opposition began to appear in regional print media and reports circulated through agency networks about the brewing storm. As opponent allegations and criticisms began to echo in the Ozarks, committee members sat up and took notice of these developments.
By late summer 1996, committee enthusiasm was nearly nonexistent. Most agencies and organizations involved with the nomination found the idea of defending the nomination against a storm of public criticism less palatable than abandoning an effort that had spanned nine years. Committee members had become very cautious. The decision to withdraw support from the project was not a difficult one according to Johnson from ORLT. He stated,
A lot of them were on the fence anyway. When the opposition started coming down, it pretty well slowed things down. …Most of them said we [had] better wait and see where this goes. I think most of them just signed on it, and when [they] saw that opposition wasn’t going away and [was] getting worse, they just declined. (Ben Johnson, personal interview)
Agencies and organizations offered a variety of reasons and rationales for their non-interest in continuing with the nomination effort. Some agencies cited bureaucratic issues and difficulties. The United States Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS), for example, opted out because they believed " …there are already mechanisms and programs in place to facilitate partnering and information sharing in this area of Missouri" and added that participation in the OMAB could not be a priority in the wake of recent staffing and funding declines (Moriarty, USFWS. Correspondence 9/5/96).
Many members, however, pointed directly to the growing presence of public and citizenry opposition. An official at the Ozark and St. Francis National Forest offered this reply to Oviatt’s inquiry,
[W]e felt it (a cooperative agreement) would only be successful if state and local governments along with interested citizens supported the effort. As you know we mutually funded a "Feasibility Study for an Ozark MAB Cooperative" in 1991 and it indicated support from the community and state leaders that were interviewed. In the 4 or 5 years since the study, there have been a lot of changes. Today, that support appears to be very weak to nonexistent (Neff, Ozark-St. Francis National Forests. Correspondence 9/12/96).
Similarly, the Nature Conservancy withdrew support due to the controversy saying:
[I]t is becoming clear that many people who live in the Ozarks do not now agree with such a broadly coordinated approach. They speak of "collusion" among agencies, fear of "outsiders" running their affairs, and fear of the United Nations oversight of local decision-making. The Nature Conservancy of Missouri does not share these concerns, but they are none-the-less real among many who live in the Ozarks and who will be most affected by MAB designation. Because of these feelings and because significant cooperation can still be achieved even without the MAB program, we have decided not to become a signatory member of the proposed cooperative. (Weier, Missouri Nature Conservancy. Correspondence 8/27/96)
Some agencies were concerned about retaining a positive agency image with local constituents and, rightly so, the potential risks to future and existing programs. MDC, for instance, openly expressed concern about maintaining rapport with constituents. This was probably of particular importance at this time because of agency efforts to establish their own cooperative management program, Coordinated Resource Management. Regarding agency concern about maintaining relationships with constituents, an MDC official wrote,
Until local citizens in the Ozark region embrace such a concept [MAB], we feel it would be counter-productive for MDC to fully participate. We have slowly gained ground in working with local groups and community leaders in the Ozark region. Anything that would jeopardize these relationships and the progress made is not in the best interest of the agency or resources we are responsible for managing. (Zekor, MDC. Correspondence 8/2/96)
Similarly, AG&F openly reported being concerned about unwanted impacts to other agency business at the time of the controversy. Specifically, they were concerned about the 1/8 cent sales tax initiative going to Arkansas voters later that fall. Monies from the tax initiative, which ultimately did pass, were to benefit natural resource management and conservation efforts in the state.
Regardless of concerns about continued citizen support, many agencies had to contend with intense political pressure. Opponents aggressively lobbied local, state, and federal politicians to take measures to halt the OMAB nomination. Due to opponent efforts, state and federal agencies experienced direct political pressure to withdraw from the OMAB nomination effort. For example, a letter sent by Arkansas Governor Huckabee to Linahan, Superintendent of Buffalo National River, informed Linahan that,
Overall, I do not support this concept. I feel the citizens of Arkansas, especially those in Northwest Arkansas, were not given enough information and opportunity to participate in the discussion and planning of such a concept. I have serious concerns about private property rights and believe that this project is not in the best interest of the citizens of Arkansas at this time. (Huckabee, Governor of Arkansas. Correspondence 11/4/96)
As opponent voices reached government officials, politicians from both states and at all levels of governments jumped on the ‘stop the OMAB bandwagon’ by publicly denouncing the program and the effort. On the federal level, most notably, Congressional Representatives Jo Ann Emerson and Tim Hutchinson became politically and publicly involved in the controversy. In response to citizen complaints, Emerson publicly vowed to fight against the OMAB and other threats to the Constitution, sovereignty, and Ozark private property rights (Emerson 1997). Both Emerson and Hutchinson wrote letters to MAB and/or National Park Service Officials denouncing the program and demanding a halt to the already dropped nomination. After discovering that the nomination process had come to an end, Emerson was quoted as saying,
[A]fter a groundswell of opposition and strong grassroots on the part of property owners throughout our region, the proposed Ozark Highlands Man and Biosphere has been dropped. However, that is not to say that future proposals will not emerge that could again potentially pose problems for private landowners throughout my Congressional district and the nation. (Standard News 1997:1)
State agencies were particularly vulnerable to opponents’ anti-OMAB conquests in political spheres. In fact, Arkansas agencies ultimately had no power to decide if they would participate in the OMAB nomination. The governor of Arkansas, Mike Huckabee, in response to citizen complaints, issued a memo to State agencies ordering them to refrain from involvement in the OMAB effort until his office staff could investigate program. Rusty Garret, a reporter for the Northwest Arkansas Times, reported to readers that "Apparently the news of growing unrest over the plan got to Gov. Mike Huckabee, who early this week ordered state agencies to hold off on signing letters expressing their support for the application (1996:A1)."
For obvious reasons, the political nature of the growing controversy would have made it extremely difficult, if not impossible, for agencies to continue supporting the nomination effort. Opponents had the ears of politicians who either sympathized with opponents’ assertions or who saw an opportunity to use a high-profile issue to either placate or win the hearts of potential voters. In any event, as the controversy became intensely political it was no surprise that members begged out, remained silent, or tried to distance themselves from the effort. Those agencies having the most to lose in a political firestorm, primarily state agencies, fled the scene leaving only those who had less to lose.
The manner in which some agencies retreated, however, was not very flattering to either the agencies themselves or the OMAB nomination effort in general. While most OMAB Committee members dropped the effort without a word, at least two agencies tried to minimize, or arguably deny, any previous involvement in the effort. For example, opponents pointed to the withdrawal of AG&F as proof of guilt regarding a government conspiracy surrounding the nomination. Anyone who visited the Take Back Arkansas Web Page could read agency correspondence that allegedly indicated a government cover-up of the OMAB-UN conspiracy(10).
Opponents triumphantly pointed to an internal AG&F office memorandum that allegedly proved agency intentions to purposely lie and mislead the public about the OMAB nomination. The memo stated in part:
The Game and Fish Commission was invited to the meeting, and a staff member attended. He listened, returned home, and that was the only participation of Game and Fish in the Biosphere idea. We have never considered, proposed, projected or even thought of joining something along the line of this Biosphere. Anyone trying to tie us to it is just barking up the wrong tree. Again, it’s just a rumor. (Wilson, S., Arkansas Game and Fish interagency memorandum 10/23/96)
This memo was circulated after the agency had already sent one letter to Buffalo National River supporting the program, and then three weeks later sent a second letter requesting the return of the first. This memo taken in conjunction with the letters written to Buffalo National River seemed to indicate the agency’s desire to deny any participation in the OMAB nomination effort. An employee of AG&F indicated that the October memo, although "too flippant," was simply a way of notifying employees that the agency was no longer involved in the OMAB nomination (John Hunt, personal interview).
Unfortunately, the general public’s perception of this seemingly absurd response to public controversy attributed one of two motivations for such behavior. Either the agency lied and tried to cover-up their involvement because they had something to hide, which is what most opponents perceived, or, as expressed by an Ozark journalist, agencies were "cowering in the corner because of some off-the-wall theory (Wright 1996:B6+)."
AG&F was not the only agency that attempted to publicly distance itself from the controversy by minimizing its involvement in the OMAB. In a press release responding to opponent accusations, the new director of MDC, Jerry Conley, was quoted as saying, "While we’ve been well acquainted with the MAB program from public documents, meetings, and communications over the years, we’ve never endorsed it (Conley 1997)." Without debating the meaning of the word ‘endorse,’ is suffices to say that the MDC’s motivation to publish the press release was much the same as that which motivated other participants to back away. They wanted the politically hot issue off their plate and as far away from the table as they could reasonably expect it to go.
Backing off from the nomination may have alleviated some difficulties faced as a result of public and political pressure at the time of the controversy. However, agencies may ultimately have to pay a higher price in terms of future credibility with local communities. As indicated earlier, the manner and rate of participant withdrawal from the nomination was continually cited as proof that agencies were hiding something and that the program was detrimental to local citizens. One vocal OMAB opponent crowed, "When the public and elected officials started taking a look at this program, it was dropped like a hot potato. Why? Obviously it can't stand the scrutiny (Middleton 1996b:4A)."
Despite the controversy, two private organizations and two federal agencies chose to stay. Continued support stemmed from a dedication to the MAB program concept, a desire to see cooperative efforts established in the Ozarks, and a desire to avoid setting precedence of effortlessly giving in to opposition pressures. Ozark Regional Land Trust and Buffalo National River, both expressed this third reason for continued support of the nomination effort. A letter from ORLT stated,
It would appear that the fate of MAB in Missouri is in doubt or at least facing rough waters. The ORLT board feels very strongly that we should not back down from what is right just because the issue is too hot. While we do not intend to take a public platform in the debate, we do believe we should not give ground to the wise use movement (Ozark Regional Land Trust. Agency Correspondence to Buffalo River, 5/5/96).
The undaunted support of a few groups was not enough, however, to continue the nomination effort. The effort failed as committee members withdrew and distanced themselves from the MAB program. Perhaps as one committee representative put it, the OMAB project was "a well intentioned endeavor that may have been doomed to failure because there simply [was] not [enough] invested in it…desire, money, and people (Mark Birk, personal interview)."
Conclusions and Recommendations
Agencies and organizations participating in the OMAB nomination effort lacked interest and commitment to the MAB concept in general, and the OMAB effort in particular. The idea to form an Ozark Man and the Biosphere Reserve originated outside of the region. Perhaps participants continued to view the effort as external to them; there was no sense of ownership and investment. This lack of commitment manifested itself as ambivalence toward the nomination process. Participants failed to actively work toward a nomination in the absence of a motivated leader. Further, they readily abandoned the effort when opposition erupted.
Agencies pursued or, perhaps, went along with the MAB program primarily because they perceived it as a vehicle to enhance cooperative management efforts. They were focused on how an Ozark MAB could make their jobs managing resources easier, more efficient, and more effective. These goals are, of course, both logical and legitimate. However, we were left with the impression that most committee members were interested in the MAB program only insofar as it accomplished existing management goals. Such management-type goals could, however, certainly be accomplished through other programs, efforts, and initiatives. Ozark natural resource mangers did not necessarily need an OMAB to achieve them.
There was no substantial commitment to other critical components of a MAB, particularly the social, economic, and community components. For these reasons, it was no surprise that participating agencies were ambivalent about the nomination effort from its inception to well after its demise. The only surprise comes when one contemplates why the effort took nine years and a public controversy to fail.
What could have been done to avoid the outcome of the OMAB insofar as agencies and organizations were concerned? An obvious recommendation is, of course, for participating agencies and organizations to be on board ideologically and practically. It is critical that a vast undertaking involving multiple public and private participants begin with members committed to both the MAB concept and the process necessary to achieve it. Agencies, organizations, and communities must want a MAB in their area. More important, they must each be willing to work toward that end separately and as a collective.
Participating agencies, groups, and organizations should appoint agency representatives that are authorized to speak with authority and meaningfully participate in nomination activities and discussions. If representatives are not able to negotiate and act on behalf of their agency, group, or organization without continually following a bureaucratic chain of command, the process becomes drawn out and decisions are made by those who are not actively involved in the process. However, commitment and enthusiasm are only helpful if the effort is well organized and directed. To this end, a facilitator would be helpful during the initial stages of the process and after the committee and agenda are successfully defined, the guidance and dedication of a nomination coordinator could see the process through to fruition.
When agencies, organizations, and communities come together to pursue a MAB designation, it might be beneficial for a newly established committee to seek guidance from an outside facilitator. At the nomination’s inception, a facilitator would aid participants in identifying critical players and stakeholders, forming unified goals and objectives, and, finally, choosing a nomination coordinator. The facilitator can ensure that critical activities are completed in the early stages of the process, thereby avoiding complications down the road.
The facilitator should be impartial to participants and neutral toward the region and effort. The facilitator must help participants identify all critical players and stakeholders so that they may be included or represented in the nomination. If, for example, community, business, or special-interest groups within affected areas were not present, the facilitator would point this out to the committee. Also, an impartial and unimpassioned facilitator can help participants articulate their own agendas at the outset and then mediate negotiations as the committee establishes goals and objectives. This is necessary so that no one participant is able to dominate the process by single-handedly shaping the nomination. Participants will take more ownership over the effort if they are able to contribute to articulation of the goals and objectives, rather than perceiving it as someone else’s effort.
The MAB program is complex organizationally and conceptually and, therefore, a facilitator must be knowledgeable about its conceptual and pragmatic dimensions if she or he is to provide guidance and advice. This is particularly true if participants themselves are unfamiliar with the program and concept. Moreover, cooperative efforts on this scale are laborious and can be daunting to participants that have never attempted them. A facilitator can ease difficulties by advising the committee and pointing out potential problems or issues and establishing a schedule of tasks and activities.
The final contribution a facilitator can make is in guiding a process for selection of a nomination coordinator. The role of the facilitator is temporally limited to the formation of the committee and early steps of the process. If the facilitator does not continue as the nomination coordinator, she or he would help the committee choose someone to serve in that capacity and then, perhaps, act as a consultant during later stages of the nomination. Regardless, the appointment of a nomination coordinator would greatly improve the chances of a nomination being successfully completed.
There are practical limits to what a group can do if each participant has extensive obligations and responsibilities outside of the targeted activity. Agency representatives often stated that it would have been ideal to have a full-time OMAB coordinator. A project of this magnitude was difficult for agency personal to coordinate and keep up with. The OMAB Committee heavily relied on Foster and then Ovaitt to keep the process moving. Unfortunately, these individuals were unable to devote even a majority of their attention to coordinating the nomination. Like other committee members, they took on this project in addition to their regular positions and responsibilities.
One lesson drawn from the OMAB experience is that such an effort requires the dedication and energy of at least one individual to guide the process. A coordinator is necessary to ensure that a MAB nomination is effectively and efficiently coordinated, planned, and executed, and all in a timely manner. The presence of a coordinator, however, should not encourage or justify passivity in participants. As indicated earlier, it is very important for participants to be involved and invested. However, a coordinator could pay attention to the details of the program and process, do the proper community outreach, set timetables and deadlines, and divvy up tasks and responsibilities among participants. With one individual focused solely on a MAB nomination, critical efforts to include, represent, and inform citizens, local governments, and communities would, hopefully, not be overlooked or put off due to pragmatic constraints. This attention to process might have made all the difference in the world for the OMAB nomination effort.
To reduce the risk of participants becoming passive and letting one individual bear the nomination process, the formation of sub-committees is a common strategy for keeping participants involved. Most importantly, with this organizational strategy nomination participants and the coordinator could ensure that all important issues and components of the nomination are adequately addressed and that none are overlooked or postponed. In the OMAB process, there were many issues that the Committee had to wrangle over throughout the nomination process, for example technical issues like wording of documents and land inclusions. Further, there were issues that the Committee should have dealt with but did not, including community participation and information.
While the formation of sub-committees would increase the workload of sub-committee chairpersons, the outcome of the OMAB case study suggests the benefits would outweigh those costs. Sub-committees could focus on specific issues or components of the nomination and process whereas a single committee can only superficially address all issues. An added benefit of a sub-committee organizational framework is creating avenues for more meaningful input and participation from interested and affected groups, organizations, or individuals—particularly those within the locality.
To further aid participants in successfully mounting a MAB nomination, regular communication between the nominating committee and the US MAB agency would be beneficial. It should be an interactive and iterative process. When the OMAB nomination was first conceived, there were no formal US MAB nomination guidelines. To our knowledge, there are at this time no formal procedures that nomination committees must be follow for development of a nomination proposal. US MAB does not officially become involved until the nomination proposal is submitted for acceptance. This is unfortunate because US MAB has a vested interest in making sure MAB nomination efforts and designations are accomplished positively and effectively for participants, regions, and communities.
The MAB concept is commendable in that it is one of the few natural resource programs that attempts to incorporate cultural, social, and economic factors in the ecosystem management equation. If, however, critical components are overlooked in the nomination process or implementation of a MAB, the effectiveness and reputation of the US MAB program in general is negatively impacted. As the OMAB experience keenly indicates the reality is that US MAB, and even UN MAB, are impacted regardless of the status or outcome of a nomination effort and level of official involvement from US or UN program entities. Therefore, it is in the best interest of US MAB to take an active role in the nomination stage of a Biosphere Reserve designation attempt.
There are several ways US MAB can become more involved in the nomination process without negatively impacting the autonomy of those pursing nominations, negating the local vision of a MAB designation, or creating extensive involvement or oversight from the US MAB. First, US MAB could greatly improve the chances of a nomination succeeding by providing MAB hopefuls with some formal guidelines or procedures for completing and submitting a nomination. Such procedures could require certain activities be accomplished, including community outreach and inclusion.
Also, formal procedures could help nomination hopefuls set timelines and goals by requiring an initial prospectus and interim reports on accomplishment of goals necessary to ensure the successful designation of a Biosphere Reserve. Benefits of this type of proactive involvement would be twofold. First, MAB hopefuls would get the guidance they need to successfully complete a nomination proposal, in a timely manner. Second, US MAB could ensure nomination committees’ adequately address all components of a MAB, thereby assuring citizens and officials that each Biosphere Reserve in the United States has been nominated and designated in the letter and spirit of the program.
To contact authors direct correspondence to: Theresa L. Goedeke, Department of Rural Sociology, 5 Sociology Building, University of Missouri, Columbia, Missouri 65211, Telephone (573) 882-7264, E-Mail: c677194@showme.missouri.edu